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Abstract
Three well-known aggregate regularities (i.e. Beveridge, Wage, and Okun curves)
seem to provide a quite complete picture of the interplay between labor market
macro-dynamics and the business cycle. Nevertheless, existing theoretical literature
still lacks micro-founded models which are able to account jointly for these three
crucial stylized facts. In this paper, we present an agent-based, evolutionary, model
trying to formalize from the bottom up individual behaviors and interactions in both
product and labor markets. We describe as endogenous processes both vacancy and
wage setting, as well as matching and bargaining, demand and price formation. Firms
enjoy labor productivity improvements (technological progress) and are selected on
the basis of their revealed competitiveness (which is also aﬀected by their hiring-
and wage-setting behaviors). Simulations show that the model is able robustly to
reproduce Beveridge, Wage and Okun curves under quite broad behavioral and insti-
tutional settings. Moreover, the system generates endogenously an Okun coeﬃcient
greater than one even if individual ﬁrms employ production functions exhibiting
constant returns to labor. Monte Carlo simulations also indicate that statistically
detectable shifts in Okun and Beveridge curves emerge as the result of changes in
institutional, behavioral, and technological parameters. Finally, the model generates
quite sharp predictions about how system parameters aﬀect aggregate performance
(i.e. average GDP growth) and its volatility.
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11 Introduction
Over the last couple of decades, a quite large literature has been trying to investigate
the process through which ﬁrms and workers meet in the labor market, how this match-
ing process aﬀects wage setting and (un)employment dynamics, and the extent to which
unemployment and output interact over the business cycle1.
Three well-known empirical aggregate regularities seem to provide a quite complete
picture of the interplay between the forces at work. First, the Beveridge curve predicts a
negative relationship between rates of vacancies and rates of unemployment. Second, the
Phillips curve suggests that changes in wage rates are negatively related to unemployment
rates. Alternatively, the Wage curve predicts a negative correlation between levels of real
wages and unemployment. Third, the Okun curve posits a more than proportional increase
in real GDP for every one percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate.
Most of the literature has tried so far to explain these phenomena on the grounds
of a standard “toolbox” based on micro-foundations which postulate hyper-rational ﬁrms
and workers. The “representative individual hypothesis” is often employed to overcome
diﬃculties entailed by aggregation of heterogeneous agents. Moreover, static equilibrium
conditions are largely used to interpret macroeconomic dynamics.
Despite their formal sophistication, the degrees of success of this class of models is,
at best, mixed. In particular, existing literature seems to lack a joint explanation of the
foregoing three aggregate regularities.
In this paper, we propose a radically diﬀerent interpretative strategy. The model that
we present in the following might be taken as an exploratory attempt to provide a micro-
foundation of the interactions between labor-market and output dynamics from an evolu-
tionary perspective2.
The underlying philosophy builds on the acknowledgement that both ﬁrms and workers
live in complex systems which evolve through time and might be characterized by endoge-
nous, persistent, novelty. Agents are heterogeneous in their endowments, wealth, and,
possibly, in their behavioral rules and rationality skills. Given the complexity of the envi-
ronment they have to cope with - which changes endogenously as the outcome of individual
behaviors - agents can only be boundedly-rational and hold an imperfect understanding of
the system (Dosi, Marengo, and Fagiolo, 2004).
Expectations employed to revise control variables (e.g. demanded and oﬀered wages,
1For a quite exhaustive overview of the state-of-the-art of both theoretical and empirical labor market
literature, cf. Ashenfelter and Layard (1986), Ashenfelter and Card (1999) and Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001).
2More on the general Weltanschauung of the evolutionary approach is in Dosi and Nelson (1994) and
Dosi and Winter (2002). The model we present has large overlappings with the “Agent-Based Computa-
tional Economics” (ACE) approach (Tesfatsion, 1997; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Aoki, 2003), as well as
with self-organization models of labor markets pioneered by Lesourne (1992).
2output produced, etc.) are typically assumed to be adaptive. Workers and ﬁrms interact
directly and their choices are aﬀected by those undertaken in the past by other agents.
Interaction networks (e.g. matching rules in labor market) are themselves endogenous and
may change across time. Firms interact both in the labor market and in the product market,
wherein their revealed “competitiveness” is aﬀected also by their hiring and wage-setting
behaviors.
Macroeconomic dynamics is generated in the model via aggregation of individual be-
haviors. Typically, non-linearities induced by heterogeneity and far-from-equilibrium in-
teractions induce a co-evolution between aggregate variables (employment, output, etc.).
Statistical properties exhibited by aggregate variables might then be interpreted as emer-
gent properties grounded on persistent micro disequilibria.
Consequently, even when some equilibrium relationship exists between aggregate vari-
ables (e.g. inﬂows and outﬂows from unemployment), the economy might persistently de-
part from it and follow some disequilibrium path. The observed stable relations amongst
those same aggregate variables might emerge out of turbulent, disequilibrium, microeco-
nomic interactions.
Here, making use of a model built on such premises, we shall address two types of
questions. First, we shall ask whether the model is able to reproduce robustly over a large
set of behavioral and institutional settings the main aggregate regularities that we observe
in real-world labor-market data. For instance: Does our model generate jointly Beveridge,
Wage, and Okun curves for a suﬃciently large region of system parameters? Notice that
this would lend support to a disequilibrium foundation of aggregate regularities: despite
the fact that the economy always departs from equilibrium (if any), aggregate regularities
emerge as the outcome of decentralized interactions, adaptive behavioral adjustments, and
imperfect coordination.
Second, we shall try to map diﬀerent behavioral and institutional settings into statis-
tically distinct patterns of labor market dynamics. For example: Are there institutional
and technological settings wherein the economy is unable to display robustly a downward-
sloping relation between vacancy and unemployment rate? Under which conditions can one
observe shifts of the Beveridge curve? And, similarly: Under which technological regimes
the Okun curve displays a greater than one absolute elasticity?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by brieﬂy surveying the main
empirical ﬁndings about the foregoing three aggregate regularities. Next, we discuss how
mainstream economic theory has been trying to provide explanations of such stylized facts.
I nS e c t i o n3 ,w ep r e s e n tt h em o d e la n dw ed i s c u s st h ee x t e n tt ow h i c hi td e p a r t sf r o m
existing theoretical frameworks. Section 4 presents the results of simulation exercises.
Finally, Section 5 draws some concluding remarks.
32 Individual Behaviors, Interactions, and Aggregate
Regularities in Labor Market Dynamics: An As-
sessment of the State of the Art
2.1 A Brief Overview of Empirical Regularities
When dealing with labor market dynamics, a familiar angle of inquiry regards the extent to
which “rigidities” and “frictions” are able to account for the observed unemployment levels
(Phelps, 1972; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In this respect, the Beveridge curve (BC) is
a good starting point. The BC postulates a negative relationship (over time) between the
rate of unemployment u and the rate of vacancies v, where rates are deﬁned in terms of
total employment3.
The intuition is simple: if an economy exhibits higher level of vacancies - in turn
plausibly corresponding to a higher level of aggregate demand - it is easier for workers to
ﬁnd a job. Thus, one should also observe a lower level of unemployment. Movements along
the curve should be typically induced by the business cycle. For instance, contractions
should imply - ceteris paribus - a reduction in aggregate demand. This should in turn
induce a decrease of vacancies and an increase in unemployment.
Moreover, the position of the BC in the (u,v) space is typically related to the degree
of “frictions” existing in the labor market and, more generally, to its institutional setting:
t h ec l o s e rt h ec u r v et ot h ea x e s ,t h el o w e r -ceteris paribus - market “frictions”. Shifts of
the curve are attributed to all factors inﬂuencing: (a) directly the process of matching be-
tween vacancies and unemployed workers (e.g. unemployment beneﬁt system, employment
protection laws, active labor market policies, etc.); and (b) indirectly the (u,v) relation-
ship via the impact they have on the wage rate (union power, union coverage, degree of
coordination of wage bargaining, etc.)4.
Empirical ﬁndings seem to be quite controversial (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; Nick-
ell, Nunziata, Ochell, and Quintini, 2001; Belot and Ours, 2000; Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps,
and Zoega, 2000). In fact, casual inspection of scatter plots of rough (u,v) data across coun-
tries does not show any clear-cut negative relationships. Even if some weakly downward-
sloping curves do emerge across sub-samples, it seems that shifts and twists prevail. Het-
erogeneous cross-country patterns also emerge5. However, once controls for institutional
3Observation of reliable proxies for actual vacancies entails many empirical problems, especially in
Europe, see Solow (1998). For instance, one is typically bounded to observe only ex-ante vacancies (i.e.
job openings). Ex-post vacancies (i.e. unﬁlled job openings) are much more aﬀected by frictions than
ex-ante ones and thus should be in principle preferred as objects of analysis.
4On these points, cf. Nickell, Nunziata, Ochell, and Quintini (2001).
5All this would demand a careful discussion on what does we mean by “aggregate regularities” (i.e. “Is
it any BC only in the eye of the observer?”) and their relationship with theory. This is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
4factors, time, and country dummies are introduced in panel-data regressions, then quite ro-
bust, statistically signiﬁcant, negative elasticities between u and v typically emerge. That
is, BCs emerge within data cells containing homogeneous groups of observations. Together,
one observes that the impact of variables that indirectly aﬀect unemployment through the
wage rate is not signiﬁcant. As far as shifts are concerned, it seems that all OECD countries
present a shift to the right of the BC over time (implying higher “rigidities”). Neverthe-
less, after the 80’s, some countries, including Germany, Sweden, and Japan, seem to exhibit
reverse patterns.
Econometric analyses have helped in highlighting the role of institutional variables
in shaping the dynamics of jobs and vacancies. However, current analyses still display
some major drawbacks. First, on the methodological side, econometric testing is typi-
cally not parsimonious. This could lead to the emergence of negative relationships only
in over-homogeneous cells, thus weakening the “robustness” of the regularity. Second, un-
employment and vacancy rates are computed as ratios between non-stationary variables,
possibly entailing too much variability over time6. Finally, the role of technical progress is
typically not investigated in econometric analyses and almost always treated as a business
cycle eﬀect.
A complementary empirical regularity is the famous Phillips curve, or the alternative
Wage curve (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994). As is known, they both posit the existence
of co-movements between unemployment and wages. Two almost alternative worlds can
be envisaged. If an economy experiments a negative relationship between changes of the
wage rate and the unemployment rate, one is in a Phillips curve (PC) regime. Conversely,
a Wage curve (WC) world is characterized by a negative relationship between levels of the
wage rate and unemployment rates (Blanchard and Katz, 1997; Card and Hyslop, 1996)7.
Some remarks are in order. While the WC is typically taken as a proposition about
homogeneous areas (e.g. regions or location-speciﬁc labor markets), the PC is assumed to
bear a more general validity. Hence, the two may not be mutually exclusive: it is possible
to think of homogeneous areas characterized by contemporaneous co-movements of both
wage growth and levels in response of unemployment shifts. However, empirical studies
(Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994; Card, 1995) show that, in homogeneous areas, WC is in
general valid, while PC is not. This seems to be a quite robust ﬁnding, holding true across
regions, countries, etc.. At the same time, the elasticity of wage levels to unemployment
rates varies - although not dramatically - across regions and countries. Notice that since
6The denominator of both vacancy and unemployment rates is total employment (instead of labor force
or population), which does not appear to be I(0); cf. however Layard, Jackman, and Nickell (1991)f o ra n
alternative point of view. The choice of total employment is required if one wants to keep a tight relation
with the BC theoretical counterpart modeled through a homogenous of degree one matching function (see
below). In the model which follows, we deﬁne all rates in terms of total population (or labor force).
7For additional evidence on the wage vs. Phillips curves debate - especially concerning “wage-price
spirals” - see Flaschel, Kauermann, and Semmler (2003) and references therein.
5diﬀerent wage-unemployment elasticities imply diﬀerent degrees of responsiveness of wages
to labor market conditions (as reﬂected by unemployment rate), workers can earn diﬀerent
wages - holding other conditions ﬁxed - when they choose to work in regions with high or
low unemployment rates.
As the WC pertains to homogeneous data cells, one cannot “see it” in rough data.
Panel data estimation must be performed in order to control for variables such as personal
characteristics of workers, labor market institutions, “ﬁxed” eﬀects allowing discrimination
among sectors or regions, etc. . A strong results here is that a statistically signiﬁcant,
negative, relationship between the wage and unemployment rate still holds across diﬀerent
institutional setups (Borsch-Supan, 1991; Bleakley and Fuhrer, 1997).
The interpretation of a WC is quite controversial. In fact, Card (1995) prefers to argue
about what a WC is not.I np a r t i c u l a r ,aW Cis not a Phillips curve, because it does not
emerge as a mispeciﬁcation of a PC regression. Moreover, a WC is not a supply function,
as it cannot be obtained as a short-run inverted labor supply function (i.e. a relationship
linking wage and unemployment through a given supply of labor in the short-run).
Nevertheless, once one has acknowledged the fact that the WC robustly emerges as an
aggregate empirical regularity, some important implications follow. On the one hand, the
market-clearing (equilibrium) interpretation underlying a PC cannot be invoked anymore.
On the other hand, the competitive equilibrium framework does not easily account for
WC emergence. In fact, a competitive labor market with all its canonical features would
lead to a positive correlation between unemployment and the wage rate. Climbing up a
downward demand for labor schedule - i.e. raising wage - would indeed induce higher levels
of unemployment, as the unmet supply of labor would grow.
The third aggregate regularity we address here - i.e. the Okun curve (OC) - characterizes
the interplay between labor markets and economic activity (Okun, 1962, 1970). In fact,
one typically observes a negative, linear, relationship between changes in unemployment
rate and GDP growth rates, with an absolute value of the slope larger than one. The
standard interpretation8 runs as follows. Suppose that in the economy there is a under-
utilization of labor resources with respect to the full employment level (i.e. unemployment
rates are higher than the “natural” level). Then, the eﬀect on economic activity of the cost
associated to such under-utilization is more than proportional.
Therefore, whatever the causes, empirical evidence suggests an amplifying feedback
between unemployment dynamics and output dynamics. A decrease of one percentage
point in the unemployment rate - ceteris paribus - is associated with a growth rate of
GDP of about two to three percentage points (according to original Okun estimations).
Notice that a coeﬃcient greater (less) than one entails some form of increasing (decreasing)
8Notice that an alternative interpretation can be given in terms of labor-productivity / unemployment
changes (i.e. as a cyclical “Verdoorn-Kaldor” type of law), displaying rising productivity as unemployment
falls.
6returns. The “ceteris paribus” assumption is, however, far from innocent: it means that,
over diﬀerent periods of expansions and recessions, all other variables aﬀecting GDP growth
should remain nearly stable.
The debate about the existence (and the slope) of the Okun curve is not yet settled.
First, the empirical value of the Okun coeﬃcient (i.e. absolute value of the slope of the
regression between changes in unemployment rate and GDP growth) is still a subject of
controversy. So, for example, Prachowny (1993) challenges the “ceteris paribus”a s s u m p -
tion and shows that taking into account all variables that increase GDP (e.g. changes in
weekly hours, movements in capacity utilization, labor productivity) leads us to a decreas-
ing returns regime: in Prachowny’s exercises, a 1-point decrease in unemployment rate
only induces an increase in GDP of 0.66%. Conversely, Attﬁeld and Silverstone (1997), by
taking into account cointegration relationships between I(1) variables, recover an Okun co-
eﬃcient in line with an increasing returns economy. Moreover, they show that additional
control variables introduced by Prachowny are no longer signiﬁcant when ECM (Error
Correction Models) are employed and estimates are computed using dynamic OLS.
A second issue concerns whether the Okun coeﬃcient is stable over time and across
countries (Moosa, 1997; Sögner and Stiassny, 2000). Evidence shows that Okun coeﬃcients
are weakly stable over time but quite heterogeneous across countries. Moreover, the Okun
relationship seems to be stronger in North-America than in Europe.
From a methodological point of view, the interpretation of the Okun curve must be
carefully spelled out. The traditional interpretation is a static one. The joint bivariate
process simply implies an invariant relationship with an implicit causality arrow going
from economic activity to unemployment. Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Evans (1989)
have instead challenged this interpretation and introduced some dynamics in a stationary
bivariate VAR framework. Their aim was to consider the reversed eﬀects from unemploy-
ment back to economic activity. Despite the fact that their estimations seem to support
Okun’s conclusions, the bivariate system does not exhibit a clear-cut structural value for
the elasticity between economic activity and unemployment. An implication is that the
OC does not seem to be very robust in a dynamic perspective.
Finally, as it happens to both BC and WC, one typically faces a few important, data-
related, problems. For example, while many econometric studies employ as measures of
unemployment and GDP changes their deviations from some equilibrium values (i.e. “nat-
ural” unemployment rate and potential GDP, respectively), Okun’s original analysis was
in terms of growth rates (Okun, 1962). In turn, the contemporary re-formulation might
entail many estimation biases, e.g. those related to the estimation of “natural” levels. Fur-
thermore, one has to assume that the unemployment rate and GDP are stationary around
a deterministic trend (which instead might be stochastic). For all those reasons, in the
following we shall use one-period growth rates instead of deviations.
72.2 Theoretical Explanations of Aggregate Labor-Market Regu-
larities
Mainstream economic theory has been trying to explain the foregoing aggregate regular-
ities in the familiar equilibrium-cum-rationality framework, building the explanation on
the shoulders of hyper-rational, maximizing, representative worker and ﬁrm. Hence, any
aggregate regularity is interpreted as the equilibrium outcome of some maximizing exer-
cises carried out by such agents. Thus, even when the sign in the equilibrium correlation
between any two aggregate variables (e.g. vacancy and unemployment rates) is derived
from an intertemporal optimization problem, the hyper-rationality assumption allows one
to compress the entire (inﬁnite) stream of choices in a unique, simultaneous, decision im-
plying non reversible, consistent, choices.
A paradigmatic example of such modeling strategy can be found within the theoret-
ical literature aimed at micro-founding and explaining the BC. Suppose we start from a
standard “matching model” (Pissarides, 2000; Blanchard and Diamond, 1989). Then, the
total number of hires from unemployment (i.e. the number of matches) M in the economy
can be given by ε · m(cU,V ),w h e r eU is unemployment, V is the number of vacancies, c
is search eﬀectiveness of unemployed workers and ε is matching eﬃciency.
All search and matching, which in reality is an inherently dynamic process, is thus
described in a static setting by means of a deterministic matching function m,w h i c hi s
assumed to be well-behaved, homogeneous of degree one, and increasing in both arguments.
In equilibrium, given employment level N and the exogenous inﬂow rate into unemployment
s,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a tsN = M = ε · m(cU,V ). Exploiting constant returns to scale, one
thus gets a BC:
s = ε · m(c · u,v), (1)
where u = U/N and v = V/N are unemployment and vacancy rates.
It is worthwhile noticing that the BC relationship is directly implied by the functional
form and the parametric assumptions of the matching function m.I np a r t i c u l a r ,t h eB C
is treated here as a static (long-run) equilibrium locus in the u − v space, requiring that
all ﬂo w si na n do u to fu n e m p l o y m e n tm u s ta l w a y sc o m p e n s a t e 9.N e e d l e s st os a y ,t h i si sa t
odds with any empirical observation.
Moreover, in order to get the desired results, many over-simplifying assumptions are
required. First, the environment must be strictly stationary, ruling out any form of tech-
nological and organizational change, as well as any type of endogenous selection amongst
ﬁrms and workers. Second, the presence of a hyper-rational, representative individual rules
out the possibility of accounting for any form of heterogeneity across ﬁrms and workers.
9On the contrary, the model we present below allows the economy to evolve on a permanent disequi-
librium path.
8More than that: it excludes the very possibility of analyzing any interaction process among
agents10. Third, as a consequence, one is prevented from studying the dynamic outcomes
of multiple (reversible) decisions of hiring, ﬁring, quitting, and searching which unfold over
time.
Similar critiques also apply to the purported micro-foundations of Wage and Okun
curves11. Consider the Wage curve ﬁrst. Since a competitive equilibrium market frame-
work cannot account for a downward sloping equilibrium relationship between wage and
unemployment rates (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994; Card, 1995), other frameworks de-
parting from perfect competition have to be devised in order to provide a rationale for
this robust piece of aggregate evidence. Models generating a WC belong to two strands.
First, bargaining models build on the idea that higher levels of joblessness produce lower
bargaining power for workers and thus a reduced ability to elicit some kind of surplus. This
eﬀect can be ampliﬁed by the existence of a union in the labor market. This interpretation
employs implicit contract theory and assumes that a contract does not only consist of a
wage level, but also of some implicit temporary insurance against unemployment. Second,
eﬃciency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) assume that unemployment functions
as a “discipline device” for workers. Other things being equal, higher unemployment levels
induce a higher probability of job loss. Therefore, rational employees should exert a higher
eﬀort in the high-unemployment equilibrium, even if they receive a lower wage.
Note that, in these alternative WC models, what varies are the assumptions on what
causes the departures from the perfect competition set-up, but they all continue to share a
rationality-cum-equilibrium, static framework. Similar considerations apply to the state-of-
the-art of contemporary interpretations of the Okun curve. Also in this case, the evidence
is hard to reconcile with the “pure” neoclassical view in which one assumes that mar-
kets always clear: in such a setting, there is no easy way to generate downward-sloping
relationships between unemployment changes and economic activity.
Since only structural and frictional unemployment is allowed to exist, a negative relation
between unemployment and GDP growth is hard to sustain, insofar as it is diﬃcult to
assume that structural or frictional unemployment declines in upswings and increases in
downswings. In general, theoretical explanations must rely on a careful and often ad hoc
modeling of expectation formation. For instance, one could assume that in an upswing
people searching for a new job still hold low wage aspirations and are therefore more
willing to take a particular job. This should result in shorter search times in upswings and
lower unemployment12.
10In this respect, the far-reaching observations by Kirman (1992) on the pitfalls of any “representative
agent” reduction of market interactions fully apply also to most contemporary models of the labor market.
11Cf. Hahn and Solow (1997) for a thorough discussion on this and related points.
12See also Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Schaik and Groot (1998) for attempts to explain the OC
within the framework of endogenous growth models.
9Conversely, both a old-fashioned and a new Keynesian perspective allow us to explain
Okun law in more straightforward ways. A possibility is to assume ﬁxed prices and wages.
Then, changes in aggregate demand induce ﬁrms to alter their output plans; labor de-
mand changes and hence the unemployment rate is aﬀected. Another possibility is to
consider models of monopolistic competition (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987) with menu
costs (nominal rigidity) on the market for goods and real rigidities on labor market (e.g.
eﬃciency wages): there, changes in aggregate demand can be easily shown to aﬀect output
and therefore unemployment13.
Notwithstanding the existence of some competing, although not entirely persuasive, in-
terpretations of each of the three aggregate regularities taken in isolation, the economic lit-
erature witnesses a dramatic lack of theories attempting jointly to explain Beveridge, Okun
and Wage curves. The over-simplifying assumptions needed in order to derive analytically-
solvable models (to repeat: hyper-rational, optimizing representative agents, static frame-
works, commitment to equilibrium, etc.) strongly constrain the possibility of providing a
uniﬁed theory of the interplay between the microeconomics of labor market dynamics and
the macroeconomics of unemployment and economic activity.
In the following, we begin indeed to explore a radically diﬀerent path and study the
properties of a model in which the most stringent assumptions of standard formalizations
are abandoned, and we explicitly account for the processes of out-of-equilibrium interaction
among heterogeneous agents.
3 An Evolutionary Approach to Labor Market Dy-
namics
3.1 The Model
Consider an economy composed of F ﬁrms and N workers14. Time is discrete: t =0 ,1,2,...
and there is a homogeneous, perishable good g whose price is pt > 0.I ne a c hp e r i o d ,aﬁrm
i ∈ {1,...,F} produces qit units of good g using labor as the sole input under a constant
returns to scale (CRTS) regime:
qit = αitnit, (2)
where αit is the current labor productivity of ﬁrm i and nit is the number of workers hired
at t by ﬁrm i. Workers are homogeneous as far as their skills are concerned. If the ﬁrm
13An interesting by-product of this type of models is that productivity shocks can lead to OC as well.
Indeed, GDP and employment move in the same direction as long as the eﬀects of productivity shocks on
eﬃciency-wages are not too strong.
14The ratio between the number of workers and the number of ﬁrms (N/F) can be interpreted as a
measure of the concentration of economic activity.
10oﬀers a contractual wage wit to each worker, current proﬁts are computed as:
πit = ptqit − witnit =( ptαit − wit)nit. (3)
Contractual wages oﬀered by ﬁrms to workers are the result of both a matching and
a bargaining process. We assume that any ﬁrm i has at time t a“ s a t i s ﬁcing” wage ws
it
it wants to oﬀer to any worker. Similarly, any worker j ∈ {1,...,N} has at time t a
“satisﬁcing” wage ws
jt which he wants to get from ﬁrms. Moreover, any worker j can only
accept contractual wages if they are greater or equal to his reservation wage wR
j ,w h i c hw e
assume to be constant over time for simplicity.
We start by studying an economy where jobs last only one period. Hence, workers must
search for a new job in any period. Job openings are equal to labor demand and, at the
same time, to “ex-ante” vacancies. However, workers can be unemployed and ﬁrms might
not satisfy their labor demand.
Let us turn now to a brief description of the ﬂow of events in a generic time-period.
We then move to a detailed account of each event separately.
Dynamics
Given the state of the system at the end of any time period t − 1, the timing of events
occurring in any time period t runs as follows.
1. Firms decide how many jobs they want to open in period t.
2. Workers search for a ﬁrm posting at least one job opening and queue up.
3. Job matching and bargaining occur: ﬁrms look in their queues and start bargaining
with workers who have queued up (if any) to decide whether to hire them or not.
4. After hiring, production takes place according to eq. (2). Aggregate supply and
demand are then formed simply by aggregating individual supplies and demands.
Subsequently, a “pseudo-Walrasian” price setting occurs. We assume that the price
of good g at t is given by:
ptQt = Wt, (4)
where Qt =
PF
i=1 qit is aggregate (real) output and Wt =
PN
j=1 wjt is total wage.
Thus, total wage equals aggregate demand, as we assume that workers spend all
their income to eat good g in any time period. Then, ﬁrms make proﬁts:
πit =( ptαit−1 − wit)nit.
115. Given proﬁts, ﬁrms undergo a selection process: those making negative proﬁts (πit <
0) exit and are replaced by entrants, which, as a ﬁrst approximation, are simply
“average” ﬁrms (see below).
6. Firms and workers update their satisﬁcing wages (ws
it−1 and ws
jt−1).
7. Finally, technological progress (if any) takes place. We assume that in each period
labor productivity may increase at rates which are exogenous but ﬁrm-speciﬁc( s e e
below).
Job Openings
At the beginning of period t,e a c hﬁrm creates a queue of job openings. Since in reality
only ex-ante vacancies (i.e. new job positions) can be empirically observed, we will employ
throughout the term job openings as a synonym of (ex-ante) vacancies. “Ex-post” vacancies
will be computed as the number of unﬁlled job-openings.
Let us then call vit the number of new positions opened by ﬁrm i at time t. As far as
the ﬁrm’s decision about how many vacancies to open is concerned, we experiment with
two alternative “behavioral” scenarios.
In the ﬁrst one, a ﬁrm simply observes current (i.e. time t−1) price, quantity produced
and contractual wage oﬀered, and sets vacancies vit as:






that is, it creates a queue with a number of open slots equal to the “ceiling” of (i.e. the
smallest integer larger than) the ratio between revenues and the contractual wage oﬀered
in the last period. We call this job opening scenario the “Wild Market Archetype”, in
that no history-inherited institution or behavioral feature is built into the model.
In the second “behavioral” scenario (which we shall call the “Weak Path-Dependence”
scenario), we introduce some rather mild path-dependence into the vacancy setting. We
suppose that: (a) jobs opened by any ﬁrm at time t are a non-decreasing function of
last-experienced proﬁts growth rate; and (b) cannot exceed vit−1. More formally:

















where X is an i.i.d. random variable, normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2
v > 0,a n ddxe denotes the ceiling of x. Notice that the higher σv,t h em o r eﬁrms react
12to any given proﬁts growth rate by enlarging or shrinking their current queue size. Hence
a higher σv implies higher sensitivity to market signals. Notice that, in both scenarios,
ﬁr m sa l w a y so p e na tl e a s to n ev a c a n c yi ne a c hp e r i o d .
Job Search
In our model, workers can visit in any time period only one ﬁrm. Similarly to job opening,
we consider two “behavioral” scenarios for the job search procedure employed by work-
ers to ﬁnd a ﬁrm that has just opened new job positions. In the ﬁrst one, called “No
Search Inertia”, each worker j simply visits any ﬁrm i in the market with a probability
proportional to the last contractual wage wit−1 oﬀered. If the selected ﬁrm has places still
available in the queue, the worker gets in and demands a wage equal to the “satisﬁcing”
one, i.e. ws
jt−1.
In the second scenario, which we label “Search Inertia”, we introduce some stickiness
(loyalty) in ﬁrm visiting. If worker j was employed by ﬁrm i in period t − 1, he visits
ﬁrst ﬁrm i.I f i still has places available in the queue, the worker gets in and demands
ws
jt−1. Otherwise, the worker employs the random rule above (“No Search Inertia”) to
select among the remaining F − 1 ﬁrms.
In both scenarios, a worker becomes unemployed if he chooses a ﬁrm that has already
ﬁlled all available slots in its queue.
Job Matching and Bargaining
After workers have queued up, ﬁrms start exploring workers wage demands to match them
with their desiderata. Suppose that, at time t, ﬁrm i observes 0 <m it ≤ N workers in its









where jh are the labels of workers in i0s queue. Next, it sets the contractual wage for period
t as a linear combination of wit and the satisﬁcing wage ws
it−1.T h u s :
wit = βw
s
it−1 +( 1− β)wit, (9)
where β ∈ [0,1] is an institutional parameter governing ﬁrms’ strength in wage bargaining.
Ah i g h e rβ implies a higher strength on the side of the ﬁrm in wage setting. If β =0 , ﬁrms
just set contractual wage as the average of wages demanded by workers in the queue. If
β =1 , ﬁrms do not take into account at all workers’ desiderata.
Once the ﬁrm has set the contractual wage at which it is willing to hire workers in the
queue, any worker j in the queue will accept the job only if wit exceeds the reservation
13wage wR
j .
As soon as a worker j accepts the job, he temporarily changes his satisﬁcing wage to
keep up with the new (actual) wage earned, i.e. ws
jt−1 = wit. Similarly, a ﬁrm who has
ﬁlled at least a job opening will replace ws
it−1 with wit
15.
Given the number of workers nit hired by each ﬁrm, production, as well as price setting
and proﬁts determination occur as explained above. Ex-post ﬁrm i’s vacancies are deﬁned
as e vit = mit − nit.
Selection, Exit, and Entry
Suppose that - given the new contractual wage, price pt, and current productivity αit−1 -
ﬁrm j faces negative proﬁts, i.e. ptαit−1 <w it.T h e ns e l e c t i o np r e s s u r em a k e sﬁrm j exit
the market.
Each exiting ﬁrm is replaced by a new ﬁrm which starts out with the average “charac-
teristics” of those ﬁrms still in the market at t (i.e. those making non-negative proﬁts)16.
Notice that this entry-exit process allows to keep an invariant number of F ﬁrms in the
economy at each t.
Satisﬁcing Wages Updating
Surviving ﬁrms, as well as the N workers, will then have the opportunity to revise their
satisﬁcing wage according to their perceptions about the outcome of market dynamics.
• Firms:W ea s s u m et h a te a c hﬁrm has an invariant desired ratio of ﬁlled to opened





If ﬁrm i hired too few workers (as compared to the number of job positions it has
decided to open), then it might want to increase the wage it is willing to oﬀer to







it−1(1 + |Y |)
ws






where Y is an i.i.d. random variable distributed as a standard normal. Notice that
ws
it−1 is equal to wit (i.e. contractual wage just oﬀered) if the ﬁrm has hired at least
one worker.
15These new values of satisfying wages will then be employed in the updating process. Since satisfying
wage can be interpreted as (myopic) expectations, satisfying wage updating plays in the model the role of
expectation formation process.
16All results we present in the next Section are robust to alternative assumptions concerning entry and
exit.
14• Workers:I fw o r k e rj remains unemployed after matching and bargaining, he might
want to reduce his satisﬁcing wage (without violating the reservation wage threshold).
Otherwise, he might want to demand a higher wage during the next bargaining







jt−1(1 − |Y |)}
ws




where Y is an i.i.d. random variable distributed as a standard normal. Again,
ws
jt−1 = wjt if j has been just hired.
Technological Progress
The last major ingredient of the model regards labor productivity dynamics. Here, we
experiment with two “technological scenarios”. In the ﬁrst one (“No Technological
Progress”), we study a system where labor productivity does not change through time
(i.e. αit = αi, ∀i)17. In the second scenario (“Technological Progress”), we allow for an
exogenous, albeit ﬁrm-speciﬁc, dynamics of labor productivities. We start with initially
homogeneous labor coeﬃcients (αi0 = α) and we let them grow stochastically over time
according to the following multiplicative process:
αit = αit−1(1 + Z), (12)
where Z, conditionally on Z>0, is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable with
mean 0 and variance σ2
Z ≥ 018. The latter governs the opportunity setting in the economy.
The larger σZ, the more likely ﬁrms draw large productivity improvements. Notice that if
we let σZ =0we recover the “No Technological Progress”s c e n a r i o .
3.2 Initial Conditions, Micro- and Macro-Dynamics
The foregoing model, as mentioned, genuinely belongs to an evolutionary/ACE approach.
Given its behavioral, bottom-up, perspective, one must resort to computer simulations to
explore the behavior of the system19. One of the main goals is to look for meta-stable
properties (and rarely to equilibria in the traditional sense) which emerge as the result of
the co-evolution among individual behaviors over time and persist for suﬃciently long time
spans.
17Labor productivity may in turn be either homogeneous across ﬁrms (αi = α)o rn o t .
18Hence, there is a probability 0.5 to draw a neutral labor productivity shock (Z =0 ), while positive
shocks are distributed as the positive half of a N(0,1).
19Simulation code is written in C++ and is available from the Authors upon request.
15In our model, the dynamics of the system depends on four sets of factors. First,w e
distinguish behavioral (e.g. concerning job opening and job search) and technological
scenarios. We call such discrete institutional and technological regimes “system setups”.
Second, a choice of system parameters (F/N, σv, β, σZ)i sr e q u i r e d( s e eT a b l e1).
Parameter Range Meaning
N/F R++ Concentration of economic activity (Number of Workers / Number
of Firms)
σv R++ Sensitivity to market signals in vacancy settings (only in a Weak
Path-Dependence Scenario)
β [0,1] Labor-market institutional parameter governing the strength of
ﬁrms in wage-setting
σZ R+ Technological parameter tuning the availability of opportunities in
the system (=0means no technological progress)
Table 1:S y s t e mP a r a m e t e r s
Third, one should explore the would-be importance of diﬀerent initial conditions20.
Since simulations show that the latter do not dramatically aﬀect the long-run properties of
aggregate variables, we typically deﬁne a “canonical” set of initial conditions. All results
presented below refer to this benchmark choice. Finally, individual updating by ﬁrms and
workers induces a stochastic dynamics on micro-variables (e.g. contractual wages, desired
production, desired employment, etc.). By aggregating these individual variables over ﬁrms
and workers, one can study the properties of macro-dynamics for the variables of interest.
We will focus on unemployment:














20In the model this implies deﬁning initial values (ni0,α i0,w s
i0,w i0)F
i=1 for ﬁrms and (ws
j0)N
j=1 for workers.
Moreover, an initial price p0, and some distributions for desired ratios (ρi)F
i=1 and reservation wages
(wR
j )N






as well as its growth rate:
ht = ∆log(Qt). (17)
Related Literature on Matching and Labor-Market Dynamics: A Necessary Digression
One of the key features of the foregoing model is an explicit microfoundation - within an
evolutionary framework - of labor market dynamics regarding the processes governing e.g.
job opening, job search, matching, bargaining, and wage setting.
Standard theoretical literature on matching in labor markets, as mentioned above, has
typically abstracted from any explicit account of decentralized interaction patterns. For
example, matching models based upon a “search equilibrium” framework21, while stress-
ing the existence of frictions and imperfect information in labor markets, have implicitly
assumed a sort of centralized, equilibrium, device matching the “representative ﬁrm” and
the “representative worker” (eq. 1 stands precisely for that). Wage setting is then often
assumed to be a Nash bargaining process. Given these strong assumptions, as well as the
restrictions on the shape of the matching function itself, it is not surprising that the model
delivers, e.g., Beveridge curves.
The bottom line of the exercises belonging to the “pure equilibrium” genre is that they
turn out to be unable, almost by construction, to account for involuntary unemployment
or even endogenous changes in the “equilibrium” rates of unemployment. Important ad-
vances, incrementally departing from the standard model, have tried to incorporate agents’
informational limitations, in order to account for phenomena such as endogenous ﬂuctua-
tions in aggregate activity and persistent involuntary unemployment (see e.g. the seminal
work by Phelps and Winter (1970) and Phelps (1994)).
More recently, some eﬀorts have been made to depart from exogenous and deterministic
matching devices and assume some “endogenous matching” mechanism to describe the
(Walrasian) decentralized process governing the meetings between ﬁrms and workers in
the labor market22. For instance, Lagos (2000) studies an ex-ante frictionless and random
decentralized matching process, while Peters (1991) describes wage oﬀe r sa sas e q u e n t i a l
game with incomplete information where ﬁrm strategies can inﬂuence the search behavior
of the workers. The main goal of these contributions is to study under what conditions a
centralized, well-behaved, matching function can be ex-post generated, in equilibrium, by
21See inter alia Pissarides (2000), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), Mortensen (1986) and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994).
22See Lagos (2000), Peters (1991), Cao and Shi (2000), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Smith and
Zenou (2003) and Julien, Kennes, and King (2000).
17some decentralized, endogenous matching function. An important conclusion is that, if such
centralized matching device exists, then its properties heavily depend on the ﬁne details of
market organization and institutional setups (and thus also on policy interventions).
This is certainly a point our model takes on board in its full importance, and it does so
through an explicit account of the (disequilibrium) unfolding of the interaction process. In
this respect, our model has three important antecedents in labor market literature. First,
the out-of-equilibrium, interaction-based perspective that we pursue is a distinctive fea-
ture of “self-organization” labor market models23. They assume heterogeneous, boundedly
rational workers and ﬁrms meeting at random over time in institutionally-shaped labor
markets. For given institutional arrangements, the system self-organizes in long-run con-
ﬁgurations where diﬀerent unemployment and wage levels emerge as the result of individual
choices and interactions. Second, the ACE model in Tesfatsion (2001)a l s oa s s u m e sm a n y
heterogenous, interacting agents, characterized by “internal states” and behavioral rules,
who exchange information in the market. Matching occurs in a decentralized way through
ao n e - s i d e do ﬀer auction and individual work-site payoﬀsa r em o d e l e da si naP r i s o n e r -
Dilemma game. Third, Aoki (2003) extends the ACE model of ﬂuctuations and growth
proposed in Aoki and Yoshikawa (2003) to allow for unemployment dynamics. Similarly
to our model, co-evolution between product and labor market dynamics is explicitly taken
into account and simulations allow to reproduce (albeit in some benchmark parameteriza-
tions) Okun curves. However, matching and wage bargaining are not incorporated in the
model as endogenous processes. Therefore, no implications about wage and Phillips curves
can be derived from simulation exercises.
Notwithstanding many overlappings with “self-organization” and ACE formalizations,
our model proposes advances, vis-à-vis the state of the art in this area, on at least four
levels. First, it accounts for the co-evolutionary dynamics between the labor market and
the product market. More speciﬁcally, we try to nest labor market interactions in what
one could call a “general disequilibrium” framework with endogenous aggregate demand.
This feature allows us to study market properties associated with an endogenous busi-
ness cycle. Second, we explicitly model (as endogenous processes) job opening, matching,
wage bargaining, and wage setting. Third, we allow for technical progress and the ensuing
macroeconomic growth. Fourth, in the analysis of the results, we go beyond an “exercise
in plausibility” and we explicitly compare the statistical properties of the simulated en-
vironments with empirically observed ones, speciﬁcally with respect to the emergence of
Beveridge, Wage, and Okun curves.
23Cf. Lesourne (1992) and Laﬀond and Lesourne (2000). Self-organizing processes are discussed in Witt
(1985).
184 Simulation Results
The general strategy of our simulation experiments runs as follows. First, we attempt to
identify some general conditions (i.e. setups and parameters choices) under which the model
is able jointly to replicate the three aggregate regularities characterizing labor markets
dynamics and economic activity discussed in Section 2.
Second, in order to wash out stochastic eﬀects in micro- and macro-dynamics speciﬁc
to single sample paths, we perform Monte Carlo exercises so as to understand how the sta-
tistical properties of labor-market dynamics and economic activity change across diﬀerent
parameterizations and setups.
4.1 Simulation Setups
All simulation exercises we present in the paper refer to (and compare) the following
behavioral and institutional scenarios, and combinations thereof:
1. Walrasian Archetype (WA): This economy is characterized by the “Wild Mar-
ket Archetype” scenario as far as job opening is concerned and the “No Search
Inertia” scenario for workers’ job search. In this world, there is no path-dependence
in job openings, nor in job search. Workers visit ﬁrms at random, while the latter
open a number of new positions in each period without being inﬂuenced by past
experienced proﬁts.
2. Institutionally-Shaped Environment (ISE): In this economy, workers and ﬁrms
face some path-dependence in job opening and job searching. We assume that ﬁrms
open new job positions within a “Weak Path-Dependence”s c e n a r i o( i . e . t h e y
adjust job openings according to last proﬁts growth), while workers search for a ﬁrm
under the “Search Inertia” scenario (i.e. they try to stick to the last ﬁrm in which
they were employed).
Each of the two foregoing behavioral choices can be associated with a diﬀerent techno-
logical scenario (with or without technological change), in order to deﬁne a “system setup”.
Table 2 summarizes the four “worlds” which we extensively explore in our simulation ex-
ercises24.
24In all exercises that follow, we set the econometric sample size T =1 0 0 0 . This time span is suﬃcient
to allow for convergence of the recursive moments for all variables under study.























Table 2: System Setups
4.2 Some Qualitative Evidence
We start by investigating from a qualitative perspective the emergence of Beveridge, Wage,
and Okun curves in an economy characterized by the “Walrasian Archetype”.
In this world where agents decide myopically and do not carry over past information,
the system does not allow the recovery of any aggregate, statistically signiﬁcant, negative
relationship between vacancy and unemployment rates. Simulations show that, irrespective
of the technological scenario, the Beveridge curve does not emerge (cf. Figs. 1 and 2) in a
large region of the system parameters (F/N, β, σZ)s p a c e .
Notwithstanding the fact that matching and search do not seem to aﬀect the (u,v)
relation, the unemployment rate turns out to be negatively related to wage levels. More-
over, higher unemployment growth entails smaller GDP growth. Therefore, both Wage and
Okun curves robustly emerge no matter whether technological progress is shut down or not.
Notice that if σZ =0 , the economy works as a dynamic allocation device trying to match in
a decentralized and imperfect way individual labor demand and supply for given resources.
It is then easy to see that both Okun and Wage relationships are a consequence (and not an
emergent property) of the joint assumptions of quasi-Walrasian price-setting and constant
returns to scale. Indeed, from (2) and (4), one gets: Wt = −ptUt + pt(N − Nt +
P
i αinit)
and Qt = −Ut +( N − Nt +
P
i αinit).T h u s , i f αi 6= α, both curves are implied by the
assumptions. In particular, one should observe a unit coeﬃcient for the wage curve. If
labor productivities are heterogeneous, one should instead observe for both WC and OC
some noise around negatively sloped lines.
If, on the contrary, technological progress occurs in a WA scenario, there is no apparent
reason to expect both OC and WC to emerge robustly. Yet, as simulations show, they
both characterize system dynamics for a large region of the parameter space, even if no
path-dependent behavior drives the economy (cf. Figs. 3 and 4).
Consider now an economy in which ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by past proﬁts when they
20adjust vacancies and workers try to stick to previous employers (i.e. what we call an
“Institutionally-Shaped Environment”). Then, irrespective of the technological regime, the
model is able robustly to generate Beveridge curves with statistically signiﬁcant (negative)
slopes: see Figs. 5 and 6. Furthermore, when technological progress is present, both Wage
and Okun curves still characterize macro-dynamics as robust, emergent, properties of the

























Figure 1: Vacancy vs. Unemployment
Rate in a “Walrasian Archetype” Econ-
omy without Technological Progress. Pa-
























Figure 2: Vacancy vs. Unemployment
Rate in a “Walrasian Archetype” Econ-
omy with Technological Progress. Pa-
rameters: N/F =5 , β =0 .5, σZ =0 .1.
Table 3 summarizes our main qualitative results about the emergence of aggregate
regularities. Notice that some path-dependence seems to be a necessary condition for a
Beveridge relationship. Moreover, a standard Okun curve seems to be in place even when
technological progress persistently boosts available production capacity.
Tech. Aggregate Regularity
Setup Change Beveridge Wage Phillips Okun
WA No No Yes* No Yes*
WA Yes No Yes No Yes
ISE No Yes Yes* No Yes*
ISE Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Table 3: Emergence of Aggregate Regularities: Qualitative Results. (*) The associated




















Figure 3: Emergence of Wage curve
in a “Walrasian Archetype” Economy
with Technological Progress. Parame-
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Figure 4: Emergence of Okun curve
in a “Walrasian Archetype” Economy
with Technological Progress. Parame-






















Figure 5: Emergence of Beveridge curve in
a “Institutionally-Shaped” Environment
without Technological Progress. Param-


























Figure 6: Emergence of Beveridge curve in
a “Institutionally-Shaped” Environment
with Technological Progress. Parame-






















Figure 7: Emergence of Wage curve in
a “Institutionally-Shaped” Environment
with Technological Progress. Parame-
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Figure 8: Emergence of Okun curve in
a “Institutionally-Shaped” Environment
with Technological Progress. Parame-
ters: N/F =5 , β =0 .5, σZ =0 .1.
Finally, despite persistent heterogeneity arising endogenously from labor productivity
dynamics, Phillips-curve type of regularities are typically rejected by the simulated data
in favor of a Wage curve relationship.
4.3 Monte Carlo Experiments
In the last section, we singled out some broad behavioral and technological conditions
under which aggregate regularities of interest emerge for a suﬃciently large sub-region of
the parameter space. We now turn to a more detailed and quantitative study addressing
the robustness of emergence results. We present here two sets of exercises.
First, we study whether the implications summarized in Table 3 are robust, for any
given parametrization, across independent realizations (i.e. time-series). To this end, in
each of the four main “setups” under study, we identify a “benchmark” setting for system
parameters, and we generate M independent (Monte Carlo) simulations. We then study
the moments of the distributions of the statistics of interest. We focus in particular on
test statistics for the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients in Beveridge and Okun regressions, the
magnitude of the Okun coeﬃcient, as well as test statistics discriminating between Wage
and Phillips curves.
Second, we will perform some simple “comparative dynamics” exercises to investigate
what happens to emergent regularities when one tunes system parameters within each
“setup”. We are in particular interested in detecting shifts (if any) in the Beveridge
curve and changes in the Okun coeﬃcients. Once again, we will discuss the outcome
of Monte Carlo statistics coming from independent time-series simulation runs for any
23given parametrization25.
Emergence of Aggregate Regularities: Robustness Tests
To begin with, consider the emergence of Beveridge curves. Suppose that, for any setup
under analysis, a benchmark parametrization under which the results in Table 3 hold is
given. Following existing empirical literature, we computed, for each of M independent
simulated time-series, estimates (and R2) for the simple time-series regression:
ut = b0 + b1vt +  t, (18)
where  t is white-noise, ut is the unemployment rate and vt is the vacancy rate (both deﬁned
as activity rates). We also performed two-tailed test statistics for the null hypothesis b1 =0
and computed the percentage of rejections (i.e. frequency of emergence of Beveridge curve,
in case of a negative estimate). We then computed the Monte Carlo average and standard
deviation of estimates b b1, of their standard errors σ(b b1) and goodness-of-ﬁt R2, together
with the maximum value of the distribution of tail-probabilities for the test b1 =0 .
As Table 4 shows, estimates for the Beveridge coeﬃcient are, on average, negative.
In more detail, the “institutionally-shaped environment” entails a 100% percentage of
rejections for the test (i.e. a statistically signiﬁcant Beveridge curve always emerges).
However, when a WA is assumed, the frequency of rejections dramatically decreases. In this
case, the distribution of tail probabilities is considerably shifted to the right as compared to
a WA economy. This means that the emergence of a Beveridge curve in a WA economy may
be considered as a quite rare event. This result is also conﬁrmed by looking at goodness-
of-ﬁt: average R2 are much lower in the WA case than in the ISE. Furthermore, the
dispersion of the Monte Carlo distribution of estimates increases when one moves towards
an “institutionally-shaped” system. Interestingly enough, the presence of technological
progress seems to allow for an even more robust emergence of a BC: when σZ > 0, R2 are
higher and the average magnitude of the coeﬃcient increases.
While the Beveridge curve tends to emerge robustly only in an “institutionally-shaped”
economy, simulations show that a Wage curve always characterizes our system in all four
setups. In particular, statistical tests aimed at discriminating between a Phillips and a
Wage world, show that the latter is almost always preferred. Following Card (1995), we
perform the lagged regression:
∆log f Wt = gt + a1 logut + a2 logut−1 + ∆et, (19)
25All Monte Carlo experiments are undertaken using a Monte Carlo sample size M =1 0 0 .I n i t i a l
conditions are always kept ﬁxed (see above).
24Setups
WA ISE
σZ =0 σZ > 0 σZ =0 σZ > 0
























1st Quartile of Tail Prob. Distr. for H0:b1=0 0.081 0.050 **
3 r dQ u a r t i l eo fT a i lP r o b .D i s t r .f o rH0:b1=0 ** 0.000 0.000
Percentage of rejections (H0:b1=0)a t5 % 10% 25% 100% 100%
Table 4: Emergence of the Beveridge curve in alternative setups. WA = “Walrasian
Archetype”. ISE= “Institutionally- Shaped Environment”. Estimation of ut = b0+b1vt+ t.
Monte Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo sample size M = 100.B e n c h -
mark parametrization: N/F =5 , β =0 .5, σZ =0 .1 (when >0), σv =0 .1 (under ISE).
where f Wt is the wage rate, ut is the unemployment rate, gt is a time trend, and ﬁrst-
diﬀerences are taken to avoid serial correlation in et.A sC a r d( 1995) shows, the Wage curve
hypothesis implies a1 = −a2 (together with a1 < 0), while the Phillips curve hypothesis
requires a2 =0 . Table 5 reports Monte Carlo testing exercises in our four setups. Notice
that the percentage of rejections of a Phillips world is quite high, while we tend not to
reject the hypothesis that wage levels are negatively correlated with unemployment rates
in almost all simulations.
Setups
WA ISE
σZ =0 σZ > 0 σZ =0 σZ > 0
























% of rejections (H0 : a2=0)a t5 % 100% 99% 99% 100%
%o fr e j e c t i o n s( H0 : a1=−a2)a t5 % 10% 5% 5% 1%
Table 5: Emergence of the Wage curve in alternative setups. WA = “Walrasian Archetype”.
ISE= “Institutionally- Shaped Environment”. Functional form tested: ∆log f Wt = gt +
a1 logut+a2 logut−1+∆et. Rejecting Phillips curve hypothesis means rejecting H0
o : a2 =0 .
Rejecting Wage curve hypothesis means rejecting H0
o : a1 = −a2. Monte Carlo Standard
Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo sample size M =1 0 0 . Benchmark parametrization:
N/F =5 , β =0 .5, σZ =0 .1 (when >0), σv =0 .1 (under ISE).
The R2 is very high in all setups. This might be an expected result when σZ =0 ,
because, without technological progress, a Wage curve follows from price-setting and con-
25stant returns. However, when σZ > 0, the goodness-of-ﬁt remains high (and standard errors
very low). Our model seems to allow for well-behaved Wage curves also when technological
progress induces persistent heterogeneity in labor productivity dynamics. Furthermore, a
quite general and robust result (see also below) concerns the eﬀect of technological progress
upon the slope of the curve. As discussed above, the latter is expected to be around −1.0
when σZ =0 , but nothing can in principle be said about the expected slope when σZ > 0.
Our results suggest that, even when technological progress is present, the Wage curve ro-
bustly emerges. Indeed, wage rates become even more responsive to unemployment than
in the σZ =0case.
As with the Wage curve, the Okun curve, too, turns out to be a robust outcome of our
labor market dynamics. Evidence of this eﬀect simply appears by linearly regressing GDP
growth rates against changes in the rates of unemployment:
∆log(Qt)=c0 + c1∆log(ut)+ t. (20)
We computed Monte Carlo estimates of the Okun coeﬃcient c1 a n dw et e s t e df o rH0 : c1 =0
(i.e. emergence of an Okun curve - as long as c1 < 0), see Table 6. Our economy allows
for an Okun relationship in all settings, especially when technological progress is present.
Again, this might be considered as a not-too-surprising result when σZ =0 , but it becomes
a truly emergent property when σZ > 0.
Setups
WA ISE
σZ =0 σZ > 0 σZ =0 σZ > 0
















M a xo fT a i lP r o b .D i s t r i b .f o rH0 : c1=0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
% of rejections (H0 : c1=0)a t5 % 100% 99% 100% 99%
Table 6: Emergence of the Okun curve in alternative setups. WA = “Walrasian Archetype”.
ISE= “Institutionally- Shaped Environment”. Estimation of ∆log(Qt)=c0+c1∆log(ut)+
 t. Monte Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo sample size M = 100.
Benchmark parametrization: N/F =5 , β =0 .5, σZ =0 .1 (when >0), σv =0 .1 (under
ISE).
The absolute value of the Okun coeﬃcient is larger than one (and indeed close to
Attﬁeld and Silverstone’s empirical estimates), implying some emergent aggregate dynamic
increasing returns to labor. The eﬀect becomes stronger when an ISE is assumed: Monte
Carlo averages of the Okun coeﬃcient range from −2.196 to −3.072.
26Notice that one did not assume any increasing returns regime at the individual ﬁrm
level. In fact, ﬁrms produce using constant returns production functions; see (2). More-
over, no Phillips curve relationships is in place: our economy typically displays a negative
relationship between unemployment rates and wage levels. This suggests that aggregation
of imperfect and persistently heterogeneous behaviors leads to macro-economic dynamic
properties that were not present at the individual level. Therefore, aggregate dynamic
increasing returns emerge as the outcome of aggregation of dynamic, interdependent, mi-
croeconomic patterns (Forni and Lippi, 1997).
Some Comparative Dynamics Monte Carlo Exercises
We turn now to a comparative dynamics Monte Carlo investigation of the eﬀect of system
parameters on emergent aggregate regularities. We focus on the “institutionally-shaped”
setup, wherein the economy robustly exhibits well-behaved Beveridge, Wage, and Okun
curves, and we study what happens under alternative parameter settings. In particular,
we compare parameter setups characterized by:
1. low vs. high N/F ratio (i.e. degrees of concentration of economic activity);
2. low vs. high σv (i.e. sensitivity to market signals in the way ﬁrms set their vacancies);
3. low vs. high β (i.e. ﬁrms’ bargaining strength in wage setting);
4. low vs. high σZ (technological opportunities).
We ﬁrst ask whether a higher sensitivity to market signals in vacancy setting induce de-
tectable shifts in aggregate regularities. As Table 7 shows, the smaller σv, the stronger the
revealed increasing dynamic returns: GDP growth becomes more responsive to unemploy-
ment growth and the Okun curve becomes steeper. Notice that σv can also be interpreted
as an inverse measure of path-dependence in ﬁrms’ vacancy setting. The smaller σv,t h e
more ﬁrms tend to stick to last-period job openings. Therefore, a smaller path-dependence
implies a steeper Okun relation.
Analogously, we investigate the impact on the BC of simultaneously increasing N/F
(i.e. increasing N for a given F)a n dσv (i.e. ﬁrms’ “sensitivity to market signals”). Notice
that a higher concentration allows ﬁrms, ceteris paribus, to more easily ﬁll their vacancies.
Similarly, the higher σv,t h em o r eﬁrms are able to react to aggregate conditions and
correspondingly adjust vacancies. Therefore, one might be tempted to interpret economies
characterized by high values for both N/F and σv as “low friction” worlds, and expect the
BC curve to lie closer to the axes. Notice, however, that, in our model, an “indirect” eﬀect is
also present. If labor demand is very low (e.g. because the economy is in a recession), then
the unemployment rate might be high, irrespective of the value of N/F.M o r e o v e r ,i fσv is
27ISE Setup
σv =1 .0 (HSMS) σv =0 .2 (LSMS)
σZ =0 σZ > 0 σZ =0 σZ > 0
















Max of Tail Prob. Distrib. for H0 : c1=0 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
% of rejections (H0 : c1=0)a t5 % 100% 99% 100% 99%
Table 7: Shifts in the Okun coeﬃcient in an “Institutionally- Shaped Environment” under
alternative parameter settings. HSMS: High Sensitivity to Market Signals. LSMS: Low
Sensitivity to Market Signals. Estimation of ∆log(Qt)=c0 + c1∆log(ut)+ t.M o n t e
Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo sample size M =1 0 0 .B e n c h m a r k
parametrization: N/F =5 , β =0 .5, σZ =0 .1.
high, ﬁrms will ﬁre more workers during downswings, thus inducing a sort of “accelerator”
eﬀect on the recession. Thus, the consequences on the BC of assuming a larger market
concentration and a higher sensitivity to market signals are ex-ante ambiguous: if “indirect”
eﬀects dominate, we should observe various combinations between shifts to the right and
“business-cycle” movements along the curve.
Notwithstanding all that, Monte Carlo simulations show that the model is able to
reproduce the predicted shifts in the BC. We observe (cf. Table 8) that, as N/F and
σv both increase in an ISE economy, Monte Carlo averages of estimated intercepts stay
constant, while the BC becomes, on average, steeper (and thus closer to the origin). A
steeper BC implies that ﬁrms adaptively learn to open less vacancies and to adjust their
ﬁlled-to-open vacancy ratios in response to market signals.
Second, we explore what happens to (within-simulation) average and standard deviation
of GDP growth time-series26 when both σv and ﬁrms’ bargaining strength β are allowed to
vary. Recall that, the higher β,t h el e s sﬁrms take into account workers satisﬁcing wages
when they decide their contractual wage. Figs. 9 and 10s h o wM o n t eC a r l om e a n so fa v e r -
age and standard deviation of GDP growth rates. We ﬁnd that the higher ﬁrms’ bargaining
strength, the smaller both average growth rates and their variability. Thus, allowing for
some bargaining power on the workers’ side implies better aggregate performance, but also
more ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, if ﬁrms are less responsive to market signals (e.g. they
employ a path-dependent vacancy setting rule), the economy enjoys persistently higher
average growth rates and persistently smaller ﬂuctuations.
Finally, we assess the consequences of “fueling” the economy with higher technological
opportunities (i.e. higher σZ)f o rd i ﬀerent levels of β (and setting σv to an intermediate
level). While a higher σZ implies higher average growth rates in all parameter settings (Fig.
26That is, we compute average and standard deviation of GDP growth rates within a simulation {ht,t=
1,...,T}, ht = ∆logQt.
28Parameter Settings
N/F 50 20 105
σv 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.1
















Max of MC Tail Prob. Distr. for H0: b0 =0 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
% of Rejections for H0: b0 =0 99% 100% 98% 99%
















Max of MC Tail Prob.Distr. for H0: b1 =0 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
% of Rejections for H0: b1 =0 100% 99% 98% 99%








Table 8: Shifts in the Beveridge curve in an “Institutionally- Shaped Environment” under
alternative parameter settings for: (i) concentration of economic activity N/F; (ii) sensi-
tivity to market signals σv. Estimation of ut = b0+b1vt+ t. Monte Carlo Standard Errors
in parentheses. Monte Carlo sample size M =1 0 0 . Benchmark parametrization: β =0 .5.






















































Figure 9: Monte Carlo Means of (within-
simulation) Average Real GDP Growth
Rates as a function of ﬁrms strength in
wage bargaining (β). LSMS vs. HSMS:
Low (σv =0 .1) vs. High (σv =1 .0)s e n -
sitivity to market signals in vacancy set-
ting. “Institutionally-Shaped” Environ-

















































Figure 10: Monte Carlo Means of (within-
simulation) Standard Deviation of Real
GDP Growth Rates as a function of ﬁrms
strength in wage bargaining (β). LSMS
vs. HSMS: Low (σv =0 .1)v s . H i g h
(σv =1 .0) sensitivity to market signals in
vacancy setting. “Institutionally-Shaped”
Environment. Parameters: N/F =5 ,
σZ =0 .1.
2911), a stronger bargaining power for workers still implies better aggregate performances.
Together, more technological opportunities also entail a higher volatility in the growth
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Figure 11: Monte Carlo Means of (within-
simulation) Average Real GDP Growth
Rates as a function of technological oppor-
tunities (σZ)a n dﬁrms strength in wage
bargaining (β). “Institutionally-Shaped”










0.00 0.05 0.100 . 15 0.20 0.25












































Figure 12: Monte Carlo Means of
(within-simulation) Standard Deviation
of Real GDP Growth Rates as a func-
tion of technological opportunities (σZ)
and ﬁrms strength in wage bargaining
(β). “Institutionally-Shaped” Environ-
ment. Parameters: N/F =5 , σv =0 .1.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
As far as the properties of labor market dynamics and the business cycle are concerned,
three well-known aggregate regularities (i.e. Beveridge, Wage, and Okun curves) seem to
provide a quite complete picture. Nevertheless, the existing theoretical literature still lacks
micro-founded models which are able jointly to account for these three crucial stylized
facts.
In this paper, we presented a preliminary agent-based, evolutionary, model trying to
formalize from the bottom up individual behaviors and interactions in both product and
labor markets.
In the model, vacancy and wage setting, as well as matching and bargaining, demand,
and price formation, are all endogenous processes. Firms enjoy labor productivity improve-
ments thanks to technological progress and undergo a selection pressure acting on their
revealed competitiveness (which is also aﬀected by their hiring and wage-setting behaviors).
30Simulations show that the model is able robustly to reproduce Beveridge, Wage and
Okun curves under quite broad behavioral and institutional settings. Moreover, the system
generates endogenously an Okun coeﬃcient greater than one (i.e. aggregate dynamic in-
creasing returns) even if individual ﬁrms employ production functions exhibiting constant
returns to labor.
Monte Carlo simulations also indicate that statistically detectable shifts in Okun and
Beveridge curves emerge as the result of changes in institutional, behavioral, and techno-
logical parameters. For example, a higher concentration of market activity (i.e. a higher
number of workers per ﬁrm) and a higher sensitivity to market signals in ﬁrms’ vacancy
setting rules imply Beveridge curves which lie closer to the axes. Finally, the model gener-
ates quite sharp predictions about how the average aggregate performance (and volatility)
of the system change in alternative behavioral, institutional, and technological setups.
Many issues remain to be explored. First, additional Monte Carlo simulation exercises
could be performed to more ﬁnely map (e.g. within a given “system setup”) parameters
and aggregate behaviors.
Second, the issue as to whether (and how) heterogeneity is able to aﬀect the emergence
of aggregate regularities might be addressed. For instance, one could explore the eﬀects to
endow workers (resp. ﬁrms) with increasingly heterogeneous distributions of reservation
wages (resp. desired ratios of ﬁlled to open vacancies). Third, one might investigate the
consequences of assuming alternative matching and bargaining processes to allow for a
richer institutional setting. Finally, the structure of the model might be complicated in
order to investigate economies where jobs last more than one period and ﬁrms are able to
transfer proﬁts across time.
References
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1994), “Growth and Unemployment”, Review of Economic
Studies,6 1: 477—494.
Aoki, M. (2003), “A New Model of Output Fluctuation: Ultrametrics, Beveridge Curve
and Okun’s Law”, Economics online papers, no. 234, UCLA.
Aoki, M. and H. Yoshikawa (2003), “A Simple Quantity Adjustment Model of Economic
Fluctuations and Growth”, in Cowan, R. and N. Jonard (eds.), Heterogeneous Agents,
Interaction and Economic Performance. Berlin, Springer.
Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card (eds.) (1999), Handbook of Labor Economics. Volume 3.E l -
sevier Science, Amsterdam.
Ashenfelter, O. and R. Layard (eds.) (1986), Handbook of Labor Economics. Volume 2.
Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.
Attﬁeld, C. and B. Silverstone (1997), “Okun´s coeﬃcient: A comment”, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 79: 326—329.
31Belot, M. and J. V. Ours (2000), “Does the Recent Success of Some OECD Countries in
Lowering their Unemployment Rates Lie in the Clever Design of their Labour Market
Reforms?”, Discussion paper no. 147, IZA, Bonn, Germany.
Blanchard, O. and P. Diamond (1989), “The Beveridge curve”, Brooking Papers on Eco-
nomic Activities, 1: 1—76.
Blanchard, O. and L. Katz (1997), “What We Know and Do Not Know about the Natural
Rate of Unemployment”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11: 57—72.
Blanchard, O. and N. Kiyotaki (1987), “Monopolistic Competition and the Eﬀects of Ag-
gregate Demand”, American Economic Review, 77: 647—666.
Blanchard, O. and D. Quah (1989), “The Dynamic Eﬀects of Aggregate Demand and
Supply Disturbances”, American Economic Review, 79: 655—673.
Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers (2000), “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence”, Economic Journal, 110: C1—C33.
Blanchﬂower, D. and A. Oswald (1994), T h eW a g eC u r v e . Cambridge, Massachussetts,
The MIT Press.
Bleakley, H. and J. Fuhrer (1997), “Shifts in the Beveridge Curve, Job Matching, and
Labor Market Dynamics”, New England Economic Review,p p .3 — 19.
Borsch-Supan, A. (1991), “Panel Data Analysis of the Beveridge Curve: Is There a Macroe-
conomic Relation between the Rate of Unemployment and Vacancy Rate?”, Economica,
58: 279—297.
Burdett, K., S. Shi and R. Wright (2001), “Pricing and Matching with Frictions”, Journal
of Political Economy, 109: 1060—1085.
Cao, M. and S. Shi (2000), “Coordination, matching and wages”, Canadian Journal of
Economics,3 3 :1009—1033.
Card, D. (1995), “The Wage Curve: A Review”, Journal of Economic Literature,3 3 :
785—799.
Card, D. and D. Hyslop (1996), “Does Inﬂation Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”,
Working paper 5538, NBER.
Dosi, G., L. Marengo and G. Fagiolo (2004), “Learning in Evolutionary Environment”, in
D o p f e r ,K .( e d . ) ,Evolutionary Principles of Economics. Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Forthcoming.
Dosi, G. and R. Nelson (1994), “An introduction to evolutionary theories in economics”,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics,4 :153—172.
Dosi, G. and S. Winter (2002), “Interpreting Economic Change: Evolution, Structures and
G a m e s ” ,i nA u g i e r ,M .a n dJ .M a r c h( e d s . ) ,The Economics of Choice, Change, and
Organizations. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishers.
32E p s t e i n ,J .a n dR .A x t e l l( 1996), Growing Artiﬁcial Societies: Social Science from the
Bottom-Up. Washington D.C., MIT Press.
Evans, G. (1989), “Output and Unemployment Dynamics in the U.S. 1950-1985”, Journal
of Applied Econometrics,4 :2 13—237.
F i t o u s s i ,J . - P . ,D .J e s t a z ,E .P h e l p sa n dG .Z o e g a( 2 0 0 0 ) ,“ R o o t so ft h eR e c e n tR e c o v e r i e s :
Labor Reforms or Provate Secto Forces?”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activities, 1:
237—291.
Flaschel, P., G. Kauermann and W. Semmler (2003), “Testing Wage and Price Phillips
Curves for the United States”, Unpublished manuscript, Bielefeld University, Faculty of
Economics.
Forni, M. and M. Lippi (1997), Aggregation and the Microfoundations of Dynamic Macroe-
conomics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Hahn, F. and R. Solow (1997), A Critical Essay on Modern Macroeconomic Theory.C a m -
bridge, MA, The MIT Press.
Julien, B., J. Kennes and I. King (2000), “Bidding for Labor”, Review of Economic Dy-
namics,3 :6 19—649.
Kirman, A. (1992), “Whom or what does the representative individual represent ?”, Journal
of Economic Perspectives,6 :117—136.
Laﬀond, G. and J. Lesourne (2000), “The genesis of expectations and of sunspot equilibria”,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2 :2 11—231.
Lagos, R. (2000), “An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions”, Journal of Political
Economy, 108: 851—872.
Layard, R., R. Jackman and S. Nickell (1991), Unemployment. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Lesourne, J. (1992), The Economics of Order and Disorder. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Moosa, I. (1997), “A Cross-Country Comparison of Okun´s Coeﬃcient”, Journal of Com-
parative Economics, 24: 335—356.
Mortensen, D. (1986), “Job Search and Labor Market Analysis”, in Ashenfelter, O. and
R. Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 2. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science.
Mortensen, D. and C. Pissarides (1994), “Job creation and job destruction in the theory
of unemployment”, Review of Economic Studies,6 1: 397—415.
Nickell, S., L. Nunziata, W. Ochell and G. Quintini (2001), “The Beveridge curve, Unem-
ployment and wages in the OECD from 1960s to 1990s”, Working paper no. 502, CEPR,
London, U.K.
Okun, A. (1962), “Potential GDP: Its Measurement and Signiﬁcance”, Proceedings of the
Busisness and Economics Statistics, pp. 98—103.
33Okun, A. (1970), The political economy of prosperity. The Brookings Institution, Washing-
ton D.C.
P e t e r s ,M .( 1991), “Ex ante price oﬀers in matching games non-steady states”, Economet-
rica,5 9 :1425—1454.
Petrongolo, B. and C. Pissarides (2001), “Looking into the Black Box: A Survey on the
Matching Function”, Journal of Economic Literature, 39: 390—431.
P h e l p s ,E .( 1972), Inﬂation Policy and Unemployment Theory. MacMillan, London.
P h e l p s ,E .( 1994), Structural Slumps.C a m b r i d g e ,H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t yP r e s s .
Phelps, E. and S. Winter (1970), “Optimal Price Policy Under Atomistic Competition”, in
Phelps, E., G. Archibald and A. Alchian (eds.), Microeconomic Foundations of Employ-
ment and Inﬂation Theory.N e wY o r k ,N o r t o n .
Pissarides, C. (2000), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Oxford, Blackwell.
Prachowny, M. (1993), “Okun´s Law: Theoretical Foundations and Revised Estimates”,
The Review of Economics and Statistics,7 5 :3 3 1—336.
Schaik, A. V. and H. D. Groot (1998), “Unemployment and Endogenous Growth”, Labour,
12: 189—219.
Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz (1984), “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline”,
American Economic Review,7 4 :1257—78.
Smith, T. and Y. Zenou (2003), “A Discrete-Time Stochastic Model of Job Matching”,
Economic Dynamics, 6: 54—79.
Sögner, L. and A. Stiassny (2000), “A Cross-Country Study on Okun´s Law”, Working
paper no. 13, Vienna University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
Solow, R. (1998), “What is Labour-Market Flexibility? What is it Good for?”, Proceedings
of the British Academy,9 7 :189—211.
Tesfatsion, L. (1997), “How Economists Can Get ALife”, in Arthur, W., S. Durlauf and
D. Lane (eds.), The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II.S a n t aF eI n s t i t u t e ,
Santa Fe and Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley.
Tesfatsion, L. (2001), “Structure, Behavior, and Market Power in an Evolutionary Labor
Market with Adaptive Search”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25: 419—
457.
Witt, U. (1985), “Coordination of Individual Economic Activities as an Evolving Process
of Self-Organization”, Economie appliquée, 37: 569—595.
34